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ABSTRACT 
After nearly G5 years of the Hungarian 195G Revolution, several questions 
remained unanswered, mainly concerning the international responses to the 
Revolution and the brutal suppression of the revolt. The article examines the 
possibilities and the limitations of the international organization when two 
member states violate the Charter of the very organization, they are members 
of. Based on current archival research concerning recently declassified 
documents, the (mainly behind the scenes) activity and the (mainly 
demonstrative) passivity of the UN are analyzed and explained, without 
offering any excuse for the political pragmatism of the organization that was 
once built on moral principles. 
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The longer time passes after the Hungarian Revolution and the more we learn 
about its international responses by access to files closed for G0+ years, the more 
we understand that the Hungarian Revolution of 195G was a unique moment in 
Cold War history and probably a unique possibility as well. It serves as a long- 
standing example of how the international community may and can react when a 
nation resolves to determine its own destiny in historical moments by breaking 
the “geopolitical” consent, the very basis of the Cold War. 1 
The United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 by those powers that united 
against fascism, other nations could also join that had supported them during 
WWII. They hoped that even if the internal politics of the member states differed 
greatly, the principles underlying their external relations would be commonly 
based upon the UN Charter. Paradoxically enough, at the same time, several 
countries were fighting against some of the UN founders to reclaim their pre- 
colonial independence, and this dynamism deeply influenced the United Nation's 
ability to act during and after the critical days of the Hungarian Revolution. 
 
 
1 The article is based on my research conducted from 1992 on and resulted in several publications (see 
bibliography), particularly on my study Shattered Hopes and Broken Promises which serves as a basis for 
presenting the research results obtained in the last years. 
DOI: 10.14267/RETP2021.03.04 
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Hungary and other nations who had fought on the side of the Nazis in WWII were 
rejected as founding members, while subsequent requests to join were frozen due 
to the Cold War conflict. Nonetheless, Stalin’s death and the détente of the mid- 
1950s resulted in the approval of Hungary’s membership as part of a Cold War  
trade-off. 
Recent archival revelations suggest that Hungary’s accession to the United 
Nations was not based solely on foreign policy considerations. The strategies 
developed by the Hungarian intelligence services were also a critical factor. 2 
Correspondence between the Hungarian intelligence agency in Budapest and the 
Hungarian Embassy’s “rezidentura” in Washington, DC, reveals the process of  
Hungary’s preparations to become a UN member. These documents detail all  
stages of the intelligence services’ participation to obtain advantageous positions 
inside the international organization. Detailed plans were developed, discussed, 
modified, approved, and finally forwarded to and accepted by the Budapest 
intelligence centre. These plans included contact information and contact 
methods, focusing on potentially persuading the sources to collaborate. The 
prospective advantages for the intelligence services afforded by Hungary’s UN 
membership were analyzed in several confidential and secret documents. 3 Such 
advantages—in addition to the prospect of obtaining prominent positions in 
different UN committees, offices, and hopefully the UN Secretariat—were among 
the benefits of “build[ing] a rezidentura within Hungary’s permanent delegation 
to the UN.” 4 Disadvantages reported by the agents included lack of diplomatic 
immunity, as well as issues related to intelligence personnel, for instance, few had 
skills to offer to the UN as international civil servants, and most lacked English 
language fluency. 
The task of preparing the Hungarian UN Mission’s creation was assigned to the 
intelligence agents who had temporarily transferred from Washington. 5 These 
documents reveal that the motivations of Hungary’s UN Mission deviated 
significantly from the ideals upon which the UN was based and even farther from 
the new role the organization came to serve under the direction of Dag 
Hammarskjöld. 
In Hungary, the long-anticipated attainment of UN membership further 




2  The Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security (HAHSS) (Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti  
Levéltára, ÁBTL) provided relevant documents 3.2.G. OL-8-011/VIII and 3.2.G. OL-8-011/XII. Regarding the 
process of preparations for the UN membership in the Foreign Mimistry (FM), see the National Archives of  
Hungary (NAH) (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár-Országos Levéltár, MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-u, Box GG. 
3 See HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.2.G. OL-8-011/VIII and XII. 
4 See HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.2.G. OL-8-011/VIII. 
5 See HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.2.G. OL-8-011/XII. 
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Revolution. This is crucial to understanding that for those revolutionary 
participants, the demands of the Revolution of 195G—however dubious they may 
have seemed to later observers—could have once appeared within reach. 
The Revolution of October 195G, though originally a domestic matter was in a 
few hours transformed into an international crisis as one superpower, the USSR 
intervened by its army, on October 24th. The international community was 
divided: the Soviet Bloc states demonstrated overt support, while in the Western 
democracies, forceful condemnation of this violation of the UN Charter and the 
right of nations to self-determination spread widely. 
The Hungarian Revolution emerged on the UN agenda soon after the first 
Soviet invasion, when the Soviet delegate protested its inclusion on the agenda. 
Peter Kós, the Hungarian diplomat representing the Revolutionary Government, 
also objected to its inclusion on the UN agenda. The uproar and subsequent 
protest inside Hungary and beyond demanded Kós’ removal, yet recent archival  
evidence reveals that Kós had obeyed the instructions he had received from  
Budapest, as that time negotiations with the Soviets were in the process and 
withdrawing the Hungarian issue from the UN agenda as a condition for 
agreement. Fueled by the ambiguity of Soviet decision-making and the Kremlin’s 
commitment to introducing new norms between “fraternal countries,” (Rainer, 
1995, Kramer, 199G-97.) the hope of freedom had given rise to general rejoicing in 
Budapest. However, such hopes would be eradicated once Soviet policy changed 
with the outbreak of the Suez crisis and the decision in the Kremlin resulted in the 
military suppression of the Revolution. 
Hungary’s plea on November 1 and 2 to the UN resulted from their fear of 
Soviet military operations. Prime Minister Imre Nagy had attempted to avoid such 
a dramatic situation by mobilizing the international community. The declaration 
of Hungary’s neutrality, the renunciation of the Warsaw Pact membership, and 
the request to include Hungary on the UN agenda were the Prime Minister’s final 
attempts to counteract what was happening (Békés, 1994). When the United 
Nations did not respond to his telegram, Nagy sent another the following day, 
requesting that the United Nations “instruct” the Hungarian and Soviet 
governments to start “negotiations immediately.” By then, the UN’s agenda had 
been overwhelmed by the Suez Crisis, which ruptured the consent of the Western 
powers. 
At that time the members of the United Nations did not propose a resolution 
regarding Hungary, while Kós was replaced by number two in the Hungarian  
Mission, János Szabó. He did not follow his predecessor’s lead in obeying 
instructions from Revolutionary Budapest, as archival evidence revealed that 
Szabó was an agent of the Hungarian State Security Authority receiving 
instructions from the Soviets. When informed about a new government being 
formed, Szabó was eager to represent the new, Moscow-installed regime. 
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However, participants of the events in Budapest hoped that the final word 
would not be that of brutal force, but of those UN Charter principles officially 
shared by the USSR and Hungary. Others trusted in the interference of the UN 
even militarily, like the leader of the National Guard, Béla Király, stopped in the 
outskirts of Buda at the U.S. Ambassador’s residence to inquire about chances of 
deploying an international police force to Hungary.6 István Bibó, Minister of State 
for the national government, asserted that UN troops were needed only if the 
Soviets did not withdraw as agreed (Korányi, 1989. 127.). Meanwhile, Anna Kéthly 
— veteran Social Democrat leader, Minister of State of the Revolutionary 
Government, and the only of its members outside Hungary — arrived in New York 
the day after the Soviet invasion to represent free Hungary. However, Ms. Kéthly’s 
hopes were futile, she even did not have a chance to address the General Assembly, 
Hammarskjöld did not receive her, and she could follow the debate on Hungary 
from the gallery, while communist secret agents were “representing” her 
homeland. She was wrong assuming that the United Nations had a standing army 
(Bujdosó, 2003.), while on 5 November the UN voted to establish an Emergency 
International Force for Suez. The outbreak of the Suez Crisis transformed the 
focus and efforts of the UN and its Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, who 
interpreted the twin crises as an either-or situation. In the Middle East, the two 
great powers could achieve conclusive consensus, while the prospect of working 
on behalf of the Hungarian people would jeopardize Soviet cooperation. Western 
unity was also publicly fractured now that the U.S. had sided with the USSR 
instead of two key American allies, the UK and France, both being involved in the 
Suez crises. Hopeful illusions about the UN had only partly diminished during the 
critical days of the 195G Revolution. The Soviet veto in the Security Council 
prevented any kind of urgent action by the Security Council,7 and the tactics of 
the Western powers were also not properly coordinated. Although Hammarskjöld 
was absent from Security Council meetings on 3 and 4 November, he was 
represented by one of his key deputies, the Yugoslav exile Dragoslav Protitch, who 
stayed silent throughout both meetings. 
Hammarskjöld’s absence could potentially be explained by the information he 
received from the Secretariat staff. While the international press provided 
extensive coverage of the events in Hungary, the analysis Protitch sent to 
Hammarskjöld on 2 November 195G appeared to echo and sympathize with some 
of the Soviet positions.8 The text described the central power as unstable and the 
 
 
G See NAH, XX-5-h Vizsgálati iratok XXVII, Kötet V-150/000.G1. 
7 As the Soviet veto was exercised in the Security Council, “uniting for peace” was the procedural solution to 
move the issue to the General Assembly agenda where no veto was possible. 
8 “Note on Recent Political Developments,” 2 November 195G, in United Nations Archive and Record 
Management (UNARM) S-0188. 
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events as chaotic underscored the notion that the revolt had undercut Mátyás  
Rákosi’s beneficial efforts. It criticized Imre Nagy and finally, the report made 
mention of “fascistic elements” being involved. This last point helps to identify the  
source of the report, as only Soviet propaganda described the revolutionaries as 
fascists. 
Help from the United Nations had to mean something different. The United 
Nations was instrumental in humanitarian assistance for Hungarian refugees 
abroad. Over 200,000 refugees left Hungary during and after the Revolution. 
Furthermore, UN efforts assisted in shipping food and other supplies to war-torn 
Hungary (Kecskés, 2021., Nagy 2020.). Access to declassified documents revealed 
that Hammarskjöld soon realized that this is the only moving space that was left  
for him, however, he can do it only under the cover of the Red Cross, neither 
having a network of distributing capacity in Hungary nor could count on the 
cooperation of the Hungarian government until the “Hungarian Question” 
remained on the UN agenda. The UN’s relief efforts were successful and 
significant, yet mainly unknown for the Hungarian population, who realized that 
in clear contradiction of the UN Charter, no meaningful action concerning the 
military and political developments was taken. The limitations of UN efforts 
quickly became apparent and sobering. While the UN Headquarters attempted to 
remedy the lasting consequences of inaction, the violation of UN principles had to 
be addressed as well. Direct political interference proved unsuccessful and even 
undesired by Western powers: some were faced similar political situations in their 
colonies. 
Hammarskjöld did not meet with Anna Kéthly nor acknowledged her as the 
representative of Imre Nagy’s government. 9 However, when Imre Horváth, 
Foreign Minister of the Soviet-installed Kádár government arrived in New York, 
the UN effectively legitimized his government by allowing him to address the 
General Assembly and was contacted by the UN leaders concerning the relief 
efforts. 
Popular expectations that the UN Secretary-General would promptly travel to 
Hungary and confront those in power with the principles of the UN hardly proved 
realistic. When Hammarskjöld finally indicated a desire to visit Budapest, the 
Kádár government responded that they would be unable to “guarantee his safety,” 
as his presence could encourage “counter-revolutionaries” to rise again. 10 
Hammarskjöld easily gave up the plan or rather the mission of his visit to Hungary 
(meanwhile his deputy dealing with humanitarian issues, Philip de Seynes secretly 
visited Budapest to discuss relief actions with Kádár’s staff). Then the Secretary- 
 
 
9 The credentials of Szabó were originally from the Nagy government, while Kéthly’s accreditation was scheduled 
for the meeting of the Council of Ministers on November 4th. 
10 See UNARM S/0442-0138 
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General appointed a committee to observe and report the events taking place 
inside Hungary. Formed on 1G November 195G, the committee was comprised of 
three internationally renowned experts from countries not directly involved in the 
conflict. 11 The Hungarian authorities declared the presence of the experts in 
Hungary undesirable and also contradicted the UN Charter. Diplomats from India 
could and did enter Hungary at that time, bearing witness to the general strike in 
factories, hearing of pockets of resistance in Budapest and the countryside, 
observing the Soviet modes of terror and witnessing the mass exodus of refugees 
to the West. Nonetheless, they failed to persuade Kádár to admit the three UN 
observers (Rahman, 200G. 51-57., Bethlenfalvy, 200G.). About two weeks later, the 
committee resigned and returned its mandate, indicating that they couldn't 
complete their mission. On 5 January 1957, Hammarskjöld concluded that the 
creation of a larger and more formalized group was necessary. 
General Assembly Resolution 1132 (XI) of 10 January 1957 established a Special 
Committee (SpecCom) composed of senior diplomats from five UN member 
nations “to investigate and to establish and maintain direct observation in 
Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving 
information, as appropriate, to report its findings to the General Assembly at the 
eleventh session, and thereafter from time to time prepare additional reports.” 12 
This change was of major significance. No longer a crisis for immediate resolution, 
the situation became a subject to investigate and describe. The formation of the 
SpecCom afforded the Soviets and the Kádár government valuable time to 
continue their brutal “Consolidation.” This opportunity rose from the fact that the 
preparations for SpecCom’s work, the process of the investigation, and the ensuing 
production of the Report were all very time-consuming. Archival evidence shows 
that General Assembly XI, still in session in early 1957, was expecting to receive the 
Report.13 Nonetheless, the Report was not published until June 1957 and was only 
formally presented to General Assembly XII in September 1957. The Soviet and 
Hungarian authorities had thus gained nine months to consolidate their rule in 
Hungary without fear of reaction from the UN General Assembly. 
UN relief efforts went unimpeded by the Kádár government as not only the 
Hungarian people but also the Hungarian government benefited from it. Thus, 
while the Hungarian UN Membership remained intact, the suspension of 
Hungary’s credentials enacted by the committee in charge of UN accreditation 14 
 
 
11 Alberto Lleras Camargo (Columbia), Oscar Gundersen (Norway), and Arthur Lall (India). 
12 The members of the SpecCom were Alsing Andersen (Danish MP, elected as Chairman), K.C.O. Shann  
(Australian Ambassador to the Philippines, elected as Rapporteur), and three ambassadors to the UN—R.S.S. 
Gunewardene (Ceylon), Mongi Slim (Tunisia), and Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat (Uruguay). 
13 This was also known to the Hungarian UN Mission. See NAH, XIX-J-24-a, Box 1. 
14 On 12 February 1957, the Credentials Committee of the UN suspended the credentials of the Hungarian UN  
delegation. NAH, XIX-J—1-n, Box 53d. 
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remained in effect for six years. Nevertheless, Communist Hungarian diplomats 
could and did use all the UN facilities—including the podium of the UN Assembly 
Hall—to try to promote their legitimacy. The UN membership fee was also 
collected, and receptions given by the Hungarian UN Mission, boycotted by most 
democratic nations, were regularly attended by top UN officials. 15 
The group of diplomats forming the SpecCom amassed political weight and 
significant experience. However, they were also involved in representing their own 
respective countries, three-headed their country’s UN missions at the same time, 
that they served as their country’s ambassador in Washington, DC. Some were also 
simultaneously assigned to other UN committees, their multiple hats resulted in 
scheduling conflicts. Consequently, appointed SpecCom members often had to be 
replaced at a meeting or hearing by a junior diplomat from the same country. Not 
only did this practice break continuity, but the deputies also lacked the experience,  
background knowledge, and authority of the senior diplomats who had been 
involved from the investigation’s inception. 
However, in a relatively short time and with limited resources, the SpecCom’s 
members and supporting Secretariat staff were able to create a masterful account 
of the 195G Hungarian Revolution. The SpecCom decided to glean all available 
documents concerning the 195G Hungarian Revolution through media reports, 
official statements, administrative regulations, leaflets and manifestos, and 
secondary sources and set out to gather the testimonies of an intentionally diverse 
group of witnesses who had participated in the 195G events. Since only those who 
had left Hungary could be interviewed, the SpecCom gathered testimonies in New 
York, Geneva, Rome, Vienna, and London. Several participants also submitted 
their contribution in writing to the SpecCom’s Secretariat staff, headed by 
Secretary William Jordan and Deputy Secretary Povl Bang-Jensen. Complex 
administrative support had to be arranged as interpreters, typists, and assistants 
were needed, however the group did not have a security officer in spite of the 
obvious challenges. 16 
Communist intelligence agencies fixated upon SpecCom’s activities from its 
very beginning. They were particularly interested in obtaining documents, to 
identify the witnesses. Most witnesses requested to testify anonymously to avoid 
risking their lives or retribution on their families, friends, and fellow 
revolutionaries still in Hungary. Of the 111 Hungarian witnesses, 81 requested to 
 
 
15 The reception of the Hungarian UN Mission on 14 October 1957 was attended by Hammarskjöld. See NAH, 
XIX-J-1-j, Box 209. 
1G See the report of the Hungarian Political Investigation Department II, 12 March 1957 and G April 1957, HAHSS 
(ÁBTL) 3.2.3., Mt 499/1-3. and the report of Hungarian Ambassador to Vienna: NAH, XIX-J-3G, Box 13. Some of 
the transcripts of Verbatim Records were obtained by the intelligence services. See also HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.9. 
V-150352/2, 
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testify anonymously. For many, anonymity was a precondition in appearing before 
SpecCom. 
Only the Danish diplomat Povl Bang-Jensen kept a list of the actual identities 
of those testifying to the UN, he was also responsible for the pre-selection of 
witnesses, the documentation of the nature of the information to be provided by 
the witness, travel arrangements, and the per diem to cover their expenses. He was 
unconditionally trusted by the Hungarians, including those who had been 
disappointed by the UN. Because of his connection to hundreds of potential 
witnesses during the pre-selection process, Bang-Jensen was acutely aware of and 
concerned about the enormous risk for those testifying before SpecCom.17 In the 
eyes of the Communist authorities, providing testimony to the United Nations 
was synonymous with “spying for a foreign power” and engaging in “intelligence 
activity against Hungary.” Such acts of high treason were to be met with 
commensurate consequences. 18 
While the UN investigation was underway, the Budapest Communist 
authorities were conducting an ongoing investigation as part of the “Reprisal” that 
also involved witness testimony. To satisfy the demands of the Communist judicial 
system, all sources of information—statements of arrested revolutionaries, 
recollections of political police personnel, documents from the UN, and records 
obtained by the intelligence services—were used. 
The witnesses of the SpecCom believed that the more detail that they could 
relay the more help the UN could supply to the Hungarian people. However, when 
the Communist intelligence services obtained UN documents, these sources often 
served as the basis of investigation for resultant court cases. In spite of Kádár’s 
efforts to dissolve the feared State Security Authority, the same officers—whose 
training and experience originated during the Stalinist era—were often involved 
in the investigations. 
While the SpecCom chairman, Andersen was the “master of ceremonies,” the 
Rapporteur Shann played a decisive role in directing the investigation. On 20 
February Shann was already drafting an Interim Report 19 that summarized the 
events in Hungary and outlined the concept of the future investigation. First, the 
logic and structure of the Report were decided and agreed upon. Next, individual 
chapters were assigned and drafted by members of the Secretariat working with 
 
 
17 Bang-Jensen’s concerns originated from an allegation put forth by three Eastern bloc UN diplomats during the  
autumn of 195G that the 38th floor (the offices of the UN Secretary-General and his deputies) was under Soviet  
control. On the role of Bang-Jensen, his convictions, and his later conflicts with the UN, see Copp-Peck, 19G1; 
U.S. Senate 19G1; Lidegaard, 1998, Nagy, 2005.  
18 See: NAH, IM 1959 00/4/1959. 
19 
See: Hedervary Collection, National Széchenyi Library (NSL) Manuscript Collection (MC), Fond 523. 1. Tk /1. 
and 2. Tk / 14. 
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SpecCom. Once the first draft of a chapter was completed, another member of the 
Secretariat staff would review it before circulating it between the members of the 
SpecCom. The entire process—from the distribution of drafts and documents to 
the typing and retyping of the drafts, through to the completion of the final 
version—was supervised by Jordan. 
Overseeing the process was the UN Under-Secretary-General, Dragoslav 
Protitch. The Hungarian UN Mission attempted to maintain a vigilant eye on the 
whole process. The reports the Mission sent back to Hungary prove that they had 
obtained surprisingly detailed information about the different phases of the 
work, 20 including disagreements between SpecCom members. Rejecting all 
official UN requests for cooperation, they collected whatever information they 
could, immediately forwarding it to Budapest. As the intelligence services 
possessed a very effective network in the Hungarian expatriate community with 
several agents working undercover there well before 195G (with many more 
arriving after the Revolution) 21 several agents had access to certain documents, 
others stole sensitive material or took photographs of “borrowed” documents. The 
Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Béla Biszku—in charge of the intelligence 
services, and orchestrating the post-195G “Reprisal”—subsequently reported 
during a Politburo meeting 22 that they’d obtained a great amount of information 
and “kn[ew] the names of witnesses” what was luckily untrue. 
At the same time, additional information was arriving at the UN about the 
Kádár regime’s brutal “Consolidation.” These materials were catalogued, 
registered, and preserved by the SpecCom’s Secretariat staff. A summary list of the  
documents, entitled “Communication Received” was subsequently published at 
regular intervals. It named the communication source, date, and subject, to be 
circulated among the SpecCom members. Although the list was a timesaver as a 
selection and filtering device, its contents were often so concise that the members 
had difficulty determining the relevance or significance of its items. 
The publication of the SpecCom Report was a great achievement.23 Regarded 
as a comprehensive chronicle of the 195G Hungarian Revolution, the Report was 
translated into several languages, prefaced by important politicians, and 
distributed in hundreds of thousands of copies. Some of the most attentive readers 
and analysts of the Report were the Hungarian Communist authorities— 




NAH, XIX-J-1-o. and XIX-J-1-j, Boxes 209-211. 
21 HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.2.3. Mt. 499-103. 
22 NAH, Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) papers M-KS 288f. 5/37 ő.e. 
23 United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, General Assembly Official 
Records: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/3952) (New York: United Nations, September 1957).  
24 See: NAH XIX-J-1-k, Box 94. The secret services’ analysis: Volume III HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.9. V-150352/2. 
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published, the full document was immediately translated into Hungarian and 
printed for exclusive distribution among senior members of the nomenklatura. 
Individual chapters of the Report were assigned to different ministries or the 
relevant authorities. The intelligence services condemned what they deemed the 
“espionage executed by the UN Committee,” aiming to unmask and denounce the 
“criminals and traitors” who by their “false testimonies were misguiding the 
international community.” 25 At the same time, a team of international law experts 
began to collate legal justifications for rejecting the Report, asserting its 
“propagandist character.” 
The magnitude and complexity of the efforts to discredit the Report were 
enormous. The endeavour proved—even if indirectly—the amount of importance 
the Kádár government attached to the UN. Kádár’s regime had continually 
disputed the UN’ authority and prevented its representatives from entering 
Hungary. Yet once an official document like the SpecCom Report had been 
published, it was taken extremely seriously. Prime Minister János Kádár himself  
oversaw the response effort—a process that became the subject of extensive debate 
at the highest level of the Politburo. 2G As for the legal basis upon which the UN 
investigation would be challenged, international law experts referred to UN 
precedents and interpreted the Charter to suit their own purposes. Their 
arguments also focused on the laws of the relevant member countries that had 
prepared the Report and they attacked the legal practices of Western democracies 
that held colonies. 
Hungary’s right to its autonomy—now paradoxically threatened by the UN 
Report—was defended with severe wording. In addition to rejecting the right of 
the UN to interfere with Hungary’s internal matters, their main objection was that 
SpecCom had employed unusual methods by questioning “criminals” about their 
“crimes.” 27 Indeed, according to the Hungarian propaganda, all SpecCom 
witnesses had engaged in high treason by offering testimony, participating in the 
Revolution, or illegally crossing borders. Witnesses who had revealed their names, 
or were later identified by the Hungarian authorities, were accused of other crimes 
such as looting, murder, war atrocities, and undermining constitutional order. 28 
The SpecCom members themselves also became targets as partisan and prejudiced 
enemies of the People’s Republic. 29 Once the responses from each bureau were 
received, summarized, carefully edited, and stylistically reviewed, they were 
 
 
25 NAH XIX-J-3G. 
2G HSWP Papers, in NAH M-KS 288f. 41. ö.e. in NAH XIX-J-1-o. Kádár’s handwritten comments and corrections: 
“Magyar kormánynyilatkozat-tervezet,” n.d., in NAH XIX-J-1-j, Box 5G. 
27 NAH XIX-J-1-k, Box 94. 
28 NAH XX-J-10-k. 
29 See: HSWP Papers, NAH M-KS 288f. 41. ö.e. 
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approved at the highest levels both of the Party and the Government. However, 
the Hungarian government’s reply was only made public after the Soviet 
government had already issued its harsh rejection of the Report. 
There were indeed several errors in the SpecCom Report from which 
Communist propaganda could profit. However, these mistakes were infrequently 
referenced. The primary target of Communist action was not only the Report but 
the overall behaviour of the UN. Bang-Jensen also alerted the UN Rapporteur to 
several inaccuracies. Errors included the alleged legality of the Revolutionary 
government and the legal basis of the invitation extended to the Soviet troops. 
Bang-Jensen supplied a list of corrections numerous times, as he—having been 
involved from the interview and pre-selection of potential witnesses to the review 
of the Report’s final drafts—possessed a broad knowledge of the testimonies. But 
his reservations and suggestions went unanswered and often unnoticed. There is 
reason to suspect that this may not have been purely accidental.30 
Having effectively consolidated control over the country with the support of 
the Soviet Army, the Communist authorities seriously feared that the Report 
might be of catastrophic consequence for the Hungarian political leadership. They 
tried to avoid this scenario through several manoeuvres. The foreign ministry 
formulated an extensive campaign to convince other countries—mainly Third 
World non-aligned nations—that the Hungarian turmoil had been orchestrated 
by the imperialists. Furthermore, Hungary suggested that non-aligned nations 
could receive economic assistance from the Soviets, conditional upon their future 
vote at the UN.31 Embassies in the Western democracies—often with the support 
of the local Communist parties who, financially backed by the USSR, launched 
propaganda campaigns on behalf of the Hungarian government—were also 
ordered to condemn the Report. 
In addition to the diplomatic efforts and legal objections launched against the 
Report, the Hungarian government also initiated a full-scale, meticulously 
organized “spontaneous” initiative. Bishops and rabbis, peasants, and workers,  
intellectuals, teachers and writers, scientists, sportsmen, and women’s federation 
representatives were put under serious pressure to provide a “broad” 
demonstration against the Report. Nonetheless, utter cynicism prevailed. As Kádár  




30 Bang-Jensen’s suggestions were kept in the SpecCom Secretariat’s files. See: Hedervary Col lection, NSL MC 
Fond 523. 2. tk / 28. See also Bang-Jensen’s “List of Corrections,” 23 May 1957, in NSL MC Bang-Jensen Archive 
(BJA) Fond 413, Box 1G. His concerns were rejected and his participation in the work later suspended. The  
conflicts between Bang-Jensen and the organization significantly accelerated in the months to come. The 
action culminated in Bang-Jensen’s firing from the UN in 1958, following three highly dubious disciplinary 
procedures. 
31 See: NAH XIX-J-24-a., Box 1. and NAH XIX-J-1-j, Box 11G. 
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of the Report, the protesters had little idea about what they were protesting 
against. 
In the summer of 1957, when the UN efforts concerning Hungary seemed to 
bear little fruit, the decision was made at the UN’s highest level to let the 
Hungarian affair “peter out.” 32 Preparations had initially been made to discuss the 
Report at the UN General Assembly and to vote for resolutions that would be even 
harsher as a result of the systematic investigation—especially since international 
interest in the situation in Hungary had ignited after the Report’s publication. Yet 
the 38th floor decided that the issue should be closed, and the president of the 
General Assembly was politely discouraged to hold an emergency session on 
Hungary. Hammarskjöld’s behaviour might be explained by the fact that a new 
Secretary-General was due to be elected at the September 1957 UN General 
Assembly meeting. 
Archival evidence reveals that the majority of the SpecCom members wanted 
to continue their work following the original conditions of the GA resolution. 33 
As details of the “Reprisal” surfaced, the SpecCom believed that the UN was 
capable, of extending help to the Hungarian people—particularly those who were 
being arrested, tried, imprisoned, or condemned to execution. Nonetheless, 
confidential correspondence and unpublicized instructions from the UN 
Secretariat precluded further meetings and the creation of additional Reports. 
Protitch—notified by the Under-Secretary-General Cordier of their decision— 
informed the SpecCom Secretary Jordan of these views. Cordier had obtained that 
the consent of the Secretary-General to discourage the SpecCom members from 
producing additional reports. Regardless, the decision was obeyed and executed 
by Jordan and Rapporteur Shann. 
As information about the domestic situation in Hungary continued to arrive in 
New York, where elaborate preparations were being made for the upcoming 
General Assembly session. The number of court cases began to grow as the 
intensity of the “Reprisal” accelerated. Before the UN commenced its GA session, 
a total police alert was ordered in Hungary.34 The Foreign Ministry in Budapest, 
fearing that the building could become a target for protesters, 35 installed two 
machine-gun units and removed all classified documents from the premises. 
Despite all these preparations, rumours were spreading in Hungary that the 
Soviet troops were already “packing up” (Poór-Cseh, 1995.) as unable to disregard 




32 See: Hedervary Collection, NSL MC Fond 413, Fond 413 1. Tk / 1. 
33 See: BJA, NSL MC Fond 523. Box GG. 
34 See NAH XIX-B-1, Box 31. 
35 See NAH XIX-J-1-n, Box 72. 
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atmosphere of total terror, some optimism—even hope—was burgeoning. The UN 
would finally help. 
The Report served as a renewed occasion for the General Assembly to adopt a 
resolution censuring the USSR and Hungary, 3G however, they disregarded the 
resolution as they had the previous ones. Instead, they proceeded to attack both 
the UN and the SpecCom in even harsher terms than before. The General 
Assembly requested that Prince Wan Waithayakon, President of the Eleventh 
Session of the UN General Assembly and Thailand's Permanent Representative to 
the UN, serving as a Special Representative for the Hungarian Problem. It took less 
than two months for the Prince to realize that he was unable to achieve any 
progress with the Hungarian authorities. However, he promised that he would do 
his best despite the circumstances, but documents do not refer to any serious 
activity concerning his promise. 37 
The Hungarian “problem” remained on the agenda at the UN, and also an 
official document listed all the broken promises and unlawful measures that had 
transpired. The Western rhetoric stating Hungary would not be abandoned after 
the bitter experiences of October fostered the expectation that the UN would, at 
the very least, not overlook or forget the Hungarian people. The magnitude of 
these hopes resulted in the large amount of “Communication Received” by the 
SpecCom, collected, and internally circulated as before. 
From these documents, a comprehensive picture can now be constructed 
concerning the frequency and nature of the information the UN acquired. Special 
emphasis was given to the consequences of the Revolution: arrests, trials, 
sentences, imprisonments, and executions, which were carefully listed. Yet no 
action was considered by the UN, much less taken, as these reports were filed 
away. 38 
Although collecting and smuggling information out of the country was 
extremely risky, informants attempted to subvert government repression by 
sending information to the UN. Such documents included one masterful 
description of the Hungarian press in the aftermath of the Revolution, as well as a 




3G The Report was approved by the UN General Assembly on 14 September 1957. The resolution condemned the 
Soviet interference and requested those involved to observe the UN Charter 1133 (XI). The SpecCom was  
permitted to continue its activity. See NAH XIX-J-1-j, Box 55. 
See: “A magyar ENSZ-misszió jelentése” Folder in NAH XIX-J-1-j, Box 5G. 
38 The U.S. Embassy reports were also sent to Washington (see cables of 17, 21, 25 June 1957, in the United States 
National Archive and Records Administration (NARA) 7G4.00/7-1757, -2157, -2557.), submitted to the SpecCom;  
later a 72-page report gave exact details of pending court cases, as well as a summary of the sentences between 
9 September 1957 and 31 January 1958. 
39 See Hedervary Collection, NSL MC Fond 523. 4. Tk / G2. 
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But upon receipt, these items were simply catalogued and filed away. The lack 
of notice paid to the items named on the “List of Communications Received by the 
Committee” would prove tragic. The intelligence services, both in Hungary and in 
the UN, focused their energies trying to stop information from escaping the 
country or obtaining as much of it as they could. Unfortunately, they were quite 
successful, three death sentences were also the “result” of informing the UN from 
Hungary. 40 
As time passed, the “List of Communication Received” documented the 
worrisome development that death sentences were growing in number. All too 
often, when a life sentence was appealed, it resulted in a new sentence of execution 
by hanging. The last half of 1957 and the first half of 1958 witnessed increasing 
concern that the lives of the leaders of the Revolution, too, would not be spared. 
Yet the Hungarian authorities continued to reject all requests for information, 
regarding the inquiries as interference with the internal affairs of the country. 
Furthermore, they persisted in denying that trials would be staged against them. 
In September 1957, General Assembly Dag Hammarskjöld was reappointed as 
Secretary-General. The meeting made it clear that Hungary would not face any 
serious consequences for disregarding the UN General Assembly resolutions. In 
light of this decision, the Hungarian authorities had no reason to halt their 
“Reprisal.” Major trials were secretly initiated as Imre Nagy and Pál Maléter were 
accused of high treason for attacking Hungary’s constitutional order. Imre Nagy’s 
appeal to the UN—interpreted as a request for military aid against his own country 
that threatened the outbreak of a general war—became a major item in the 
indictment.41 In other cases, the UN’s attention and the expressions of concern by 
the international community did help to avert death sentences. 42 Yet the 
profound silence from the UN during this new phase of “Reprisal” also encouraged  
the Kádár regime to continue its “Consolidation.” 
News of the death sentences and executions of the former Prime Minister, the 
former Defense Minister, and their associates were successively announced in 
Moscow and then in Budapest on 1G June 1958. As the documents show, the UN 
seemed unprepared to respond to these developments. 43 After the SpecCom was 
reconvened, a communiqué condemning the executions was ultimately released 
on 21 June 1958. The minutes of the SpecCom meetings suggest those present were 
concerned    about    how    to    proceed    without    undermining    the    Special 
 
 
40 See the so-called „Lukács conspiracy” involving Ákos Tumbász, Alajos Czermann and László Lukács. HAHSS  
(ÁBTL) V-14G-247-2 and 3.1.5. O-12132. 
41 See NAH XIX-J-1-j, Box 55. 
42 Young writers, József Gáli and Gyula Obersovszky, were at first sentenced to death, subsequent international 
uproar caused the Hungarian authorities to change their sentences to life terms. 
43 See “Provisional Summary Report of the 74th [SpecCom] Meeting,” Hedervary Collection, NSL MC Fond 523. 12. Tk / 19. 
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Representative’s authority. It took significant time to establish contact with the 
Prince and then to compose a report about the trials and the sentences. A large 
part of the second UN Report focused on the reasons for the UN’s inaction  
throughout the previous year. However, the Second Report would not be 
discussed at the General Assembly session until 22 September 1958—more than 
three months after the executions. It was not followed by any kind of emergency 
measures either. 
In the meantime, Hungarian politicians established a very detailed plan to 
avoid any kind of sanctions or “attack” by the UN. Preparations in the Foreign  
Ministry began well before the sentences were announced. 44 Despite the uproar 
from the international community, the Hungarian diplomats soon revealed that 
the judicial murders were hardly followed by any repercussions. On 12 December 
1958, the work of the SpecCom was effectively terminated by the silent consent of  
the representatives from the five countries comprising it. 45 After Prince Wan’s 
term of inaction, Sir Leslie Knox Munro from New Zealand took over the job. 
However, his authority was more limited than that of his predecessor, 46 while 
interpersonal strife also tainted his relationships. 47 Both the Secretary-General 
and his deputy Andrew Cordier had also advised the Hungarian UN representative 
that the Hungarian government should not consider Munro’s role significant: 
Munro had no permanent office, working out of temporary locations, and the 
“secretary” working for him was occupied with other duties for 95 percent of her 
time.48 Declassified documents also reveal that for the Special Representative his 
own business activity was a priority both concerning lobbying for Western 
companies in the Middle East and giving lectures for different organizations for a 
significant fee. All these activities were organized by his office at the UN while the 
Reports submitted to the General Assembly in the years to come were the products 
of his colleagues. 
The Danish deputy secretary of the SpecCom, Bang-Jensen was deeply 
unsatisfied by the UN’s response to the Hungarian tragedy and suspected that all 
that happened was not accidental. He accumulated significant proof to 
substantiate his concerns about the sabotage during the SpecCom’s activity and 
concerning the errors in the Report, the lack of emergency session, the rejection 
of supplemental reports, actually the violation of the UN’s resolutions by high- 
 
 
44 See: NAH XIX-j-1-o, Box G. and XIX-J-1-j, Box 55. 
45 See: NAH XIX-j-1-o., Box G. See also the cable of the U.S. UN Mission: NARA 320.11/12-458. 
4G See the UN Resolution 1312 (XIII) of 12 December 1958. 
47 Munro became unpopular among delegates, the U.S. Mission reported: “[Munro] thoroughly disliked by  
virtually all members.” See: NARA 7G4.00/11-2G59. The Hungarian intelligence services knew about his 
“problems with alcohol.” See: HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.2.5. 0-8-079. 
48 See: NAH XIX-J-1-j, Box 231.  
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ranking UN officials. His concerns remained unanswered when revealed to the 
US-UN Mission, while the UN leadership launched a campaign against him, 
particularly after Bang-Jensen rejected to turn over the list of secret witnesses to 
his superiors. Disciplinary proceedings followed his rejection of instructions that 
resulted in firing him from the UN. When he did not give up his efforts to prove 
he was right, he was found dead in Long Island in November 1959 and until today 
we do not know if he was killed or committed suicide. 
 
CONCLUSION 
During the Cold War, it was especially easy for those not involved in the daily 
business of international politics to trust that the UN could consistently apply the 
ideals of the UN Charter to its management of international crises. But in 
moments of calamity, the contradiction between principles and practice can 
become fatal—particularly when superpowers take up opposite sides of an issue. 
Such was the case for the Hungarian Revolution, as the revolutionaries who took 
to the streets placed their ultimate hope in the United Nations. Unfortunately, 
neither their leaders nor the pragmatic diplomats inside the international 
organization shared this “naiveté.” 
Almost G5 years after the event, few key participants of the Hungarian 
Revolution are alive today. There indeed remain many unanswered questions 
regarding the UN’s response to the Hungarian Revolution. Until more relevant  
documents become available to researchers and scholars, we cannot determine 
with confidence which of the UN’s failures were inevitable at the time, or if such 
catastrophes could have been avoided by an alternative approach to the “Problem 
of Hungary.” Maybe with less pragmatism and more morality? One can fail in both 
but it is better to fail when ethically intact. 
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